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Title: LAW, NATION AND RACE  
Subtitle: EXPLORING LAW’S CULTURAL POWER IN DELIMITING 




This article explores the place of law and legality in the formation of British national 
identity and its reproduction (and contestation) inside the courtroom. It draws on 
socio-legal scholarship on legal culture, legal consciousness, and ‘law and 
colonialism’ to shed light on the cultural power of the law to forge national 
subjectivities. The law does more than adjudicating justice and imposing sanctions. 
Its symbolic power lies in its capacity to construct legal subjectivities, of both 
individuals and nations. Through the law and its categories, people make sense of 
the social world and their position in it. The law can articulate national identities by 
expressing who we are and who we would like to be as a nation. By exploring the 
place of the law in discourses of British nationhood, this article contributes to our 
understanding of the ideological role of the law in reifying racial and global 
hierarchies. It also sheds light on how the boundaries of belonging can be unsettled 
through law’s power.  
 






This article explores the place of the law and legality in the formation of British 
national identity and its reproduction (and contestation) inside the courtroom. In 
Britain, the language and the imagery of the law articulates the character and 
boundaries of the nation which in turn are underscored by notions of race, culture, 
crime and civilization. The relationship between law, race and nationhood has a long 
history. The rhetoric of the law served to legitimize colonial expansion and 
produced enduring social and global hierarchies based on the standards of the 
colonizers. As postcolonial scholars showed, colonial domination left long-lasting 
marks not only on the people and places colonized by European powers but also on 
the colonizers as they learned the tropes of mastering others and internalized their 
sense of superiority (Hall 2002, Fanon 2017 [1986]). The most enduring legacy of 
empire is the ideological apparatus which continues to shape the self-identity of 
former colonial powers. Cultural theorist Paul Gilroy (2004, 164) observed that ‘[t]he 
empires were not simply out there… in the torrid zones of the world at the other end 
of the colonial chain. Imperial mentalities were brought back home long before the 
immigrants arrived and altered economic, social, and cultural relations in the core of 
Europe’s colonial systems’.  
In shoring up colonial thinking and mentalities, the law demonstrates its 
symbolic power to constitute subjectivities, relations and nations. Indeed, the law is 
not just a tool to achieve particular outcomes like reducing crime. Beyond its 
instrumental, formal function, the law’s force is predicated upon its capacity to mold 
social life by creating a normative order (Halliday and Morgan 2013, Ewick and 
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Silbey 1998). Through legal categories, we give meaning to the raw material of social 
life and make sense of the world (Silbey 2005, 327, Ruskola 2002, 202). As socio-legal 
scholars argued (Nelken 2004, Kurkchiyan 2010), societies construct their own sense 
of social order and differ in the centrality they attach to the law in securing that 
order. Thus, the meaning, content and roles bestowed to law are contextual and vary 
from one society to another. In turn, the national legal culture informs the way 
people perceive and interact with the law and legal institutions in their everyday life 
(Kubal 2013, Hertogh and Kurkchiyan 2016).  
In this paper, I explore law’s constitutive function for delimiting the 
boundaries of the nation. In contemporary Britain, the law is evoked in political 
discourses and in popular culture to spell out the moral character and limits of the 
nation. In asserting the rule of law as a distinctive British value and invoking its 
standards for stamping out the ‘uncivilized’ behavior of cultural others, these 
discourses revive the ideological work of the law in multicultural Britain (Thompson 
2013 [1975], McBarnet 1981a). The nexus between law, nation and race surfaces 
inside the criminal courtroom where the court’s clientele contest their outsider status 
and claim belonging through the language of the law. Whilst court operators frame 
the criminality of some ‘migrant’ groups as a product of their deficit in rule of law 
culture, these defendants challenge their characterization as unruly and align to 
social and moral expectations about the ‘good citizen’. In doing so, they challenge 
the criminal charges against them and their civic exclusion.   
Before elaborating on the substantive arguments in the paper, a note on the 
methodology used and its limitations is in order. This article draws on empirical 
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material from a research project which investigated the legal and social construction 
of citizenship by criminal court staff, and its relevance for criminal justice 
adjudication.i Focused on Birmingham’s Crown and Magistrates’ courts, the project 
involved interviews with court operators (including crown judges, magistrates, 
defense lawyers, prosecutors and probation officers), observation of court hearings 
and analysis of court files. The interview data was supplemented by observations in 
the magistrates’ court by two researchers between March and August 2015. On 
overage, observations took place on three full days per week.ii  When possible, cases 
of interest –those involving foreign national defendants- were followed through 
until completion. At a subsequent stage, we requested and analysed court files for 
cases of interest. We selected cases which involved non-British national defendants 
according to a number of proxies –including whether defendants required assistance 
by a court interpreter and/or based on references to their immigration status or 
nationality made during proceedings. In total, we followed up and analysed 88 
cases, and interviewed 18 criminal justice operators.  
Although the project was not designed to ‘follow’ interview participants 
through court proceedings, some of the interviewees were parties to or presided 
over the hearings observed (and reported in this article). Because court observations 
were useful to identify interviewees, the solicitors and barristers interviewed for the 
study intervened as representatives in the cases observed and some of the questions 
we asked them related to aspects of the cases observed. However, observations were 
less useful for identifying crown prosecutors and members of the judiciary, for 
whom formal applications to the Crown Prosecution Service and Her Majesty Courts 
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and Tribunals Services, respectively, are required. Having obtained such permission, 
they volunteered to be interviewed for the project. There was no intention to observe 
the hearings in which they intervened.  
The purpose of the project was not originally set out to investigate the 
relationship between legality, legal consciousness and national identity. It was 
designed to explore court operators’ understandings of citizenship and the 
importance they attach to it in dealing with the court clientele. Further, the focus was 
on legal actors rather than on defendants, who were not interviewed for the project. 
Defendants’ interventions during court hearings were generally mediated by their 
legal representatives, particularly in proceedings before the Crown Court, and were 
carefully crafted to obtain a favourable outcome. These court users often remained 
silent or spoke with the aid of an interpreter. Formal and practical constraints to 
communication within the criminal courts made their iterations in court partial and 
incomplete. Because this paper is based only on their interventions within the 
criminal court process, further research needs to be conducted to understand 
‘migrant’ defendants’ interpretation of and experience with the law, and the 
meanings they attach to it both in the criminal courts and in other institutional fora.    
The findings reported in this paper should be read in light of the above 
considerations and limitations largely stemming from the non-everyday life nature 
of the fieldwork (De Certeau 1984, Ewick and Silbey 1998). The paper does not claim 
to provide an in-depth account of participants’ experiences and perceptions of the 
law. Rather, it is an initial exploration on how court operators and users talk about 
the nation through the language of the law, and it aims at stimulating further socio-
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legal research on the interconnections between legality and national belonging. 
While this was not the original topic of my research, the hearing in the trial of Mr 
Saeed (of which more details below) offered an insight into the perceptions of and 
interactions with the law by ‘migrant’ court litigants. It encouraged a deeper 
examination into the idiosyncratic place of the law in British national identity and its 
content and symbolic power for delimiting belonging in the courtroom and beyond.  
The article proceeds as follows. In the first section, I explore the cultural 
power of the law for nation-building during British colonial expansion. In the second 
section, I trace contemporary discourses of nationhood around the law and its role 
for delimiting belonging in multicultural Britain. In the final section, I investigate 
how these taken-for-granted knowledge and assumptions linking law, race and 
nation surface in the everyday life of the court to delimit and unsettle the boundaries 
of belonging. I focus on litigants’ strategic invocation of legality to contest their 
outsider status.  
By examining law’s power for forging British national identity and delimiting 
belonging, this paper contributes to the socio-legal scholarship on legal ideologies, 
legal consciousness and legal culture, and to contemporary debates on cultural 
difference, citizenship and integration in Britain and elsewhere. In the context of 
mass migration and globalization, the cultural power of the law is crucial for 
delimiting the nation’s moral boundaries. The construction of legality is tied to 
historical processes, most notably colonization. The law does not work in a vacuum, 
it is deeply shaped and shapes relationships of power both within nations and 
globally. Thus, exploring the ‘doing’ of the law historically and beyond the nation-
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state can shed light on its contemporary significance (Brown 2017, Aas 2012).   
 
LAW, CIVILIZATION AND NATIONAL FORMATION  
 
The rhetoric of the rule of law has endowed classes and nations with moral authority 
to exercise power and legitimized their rule. The rule of law, political philosopher 
Jeremy Waldron (2002) explained, confers on human political power the semblance 
of legality, ‘making it less objectionable, less dangerous, more benign and more 
respectful’ (Waldron 2002, 159). Critical legal scholars and legal historians observe 
that by constructing the law as objective, neutral, rational and principled, the 
ideology of the law has been crucial for sustaining the hegemony of the ruling 
classes domestically and for expanding power extraterritorially (Norrie 2001, Hay 
1975, Gomez 2000, Mukherjee 2003, Thompson 2013 [1975]).  
Legal scholar Lindsay Farmer argued that the ‘making’ of the modern English 
criminal law has been guided by the objective of securing civility and civil order at 
home and abroad (Farmer 2016). Underpinned by a highly racialized logic, the 
civilizing potential of the criminal law justified imperial rule away from the 
metropolis on people and places perceived as barbaric and uncivilized. At the same 
time, the spread of English criminal law outward was conditional upon the degree of 
civilization of the colonial territories and people. The law, in other words, was 
applied differently to ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarous’ people (Kostal 2005). In tracing the 
relationship between criminal law, territory and sovereignty, Farmer identified how 
the law as an aspect of the modern civilizing project contributed to shape the current 
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global order:  
While British subjects were to be judged by what was understood to be a 
higher standard, because of Britain’s place in the world, the broader aim of 
criminal law was to exert a form of control. The position, though, was clearly 
different between nations adjudged to be civilized, where jurisdiction was 
based on reciprocity between equal nations. (Farmer 2016, 132) 
 
By asserting the racial and moral superiority of the colonizers, law as a tool of 
colonial expansion created enduring global hierarchies. Judged by the spread of the 
British legal system throughout the globe,iii British laws became the standard against 
which nations and people were to be assessed. As such, it constitutes one of the most 
important legacies of British colonial rule.  
The rhetoric of the law was instrumental in producing the Orient as 
backward, primitive and lawless, and in contra-position to the West (Said 2003, 
Radhakrishna 2008, Dorsett and McLaren 2015, Ruskola 2002). Yet, the ideological 
construction of Britain’s self-identity around the law and legality is a partial and 
insular account of its national history, which has required a strict differentiation 
between British domestic history and the history of the British Empire. The British 
Empire ‘as an empire founded on military conquest, racial subjection, economic 
exploitation and territorial expansion- rendered it incompatible with metropolitan 
norms of liberty, equality and the rule of law, and demanded that the Empire be 
exorcised and further differentiated from domestic history’(Armitage 2000, 3). This 
dissection alluded to by historian David Armitage was necessary to avoid the 
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contradictory nature of law under colonial ruling (Mawani 2015, Rabin 2014). As 
historians of the British Empire showed, martial laws were an indispensable ‘legal 
arsenal’ of British white settlers to discipline the majority black population and to 
disrupt the frequent insurgencies by the vernacular populations (Simpson 2002, 
Hussain 2003, Kostal 2005).  
In the metropole, historian Catherine Hall (2002) has documented that 
colonial violence and the widespread use of martial law to placate resistance were 
opposed through the appeal to English freedoms. In the aftermath of the Morant Bay 
massacre in Jamaica (1865), progressive Brummie politicians and religious leaders 
claimed that the rule of law should apply equally to all British subjects. They also 
reminded the government that British rule can only be justified ‘in the fact that we 
can hold out to them the enjoyment of a higher liberty, the protection of more just 
and equal laws, the administration of more enlightened rulers than they could 
themselves secure’ (quoted in Hall 2002, 423).      
Yet, as EP Thompson acknowledged, the law is not merely an instrument of 
the powerful to legitimize their rule: ‘law has not been imposed upon men from 
above: it has also been a medium within which other social conflicts have been 
fought out’.  Law’s cultural power resides in its capacity to accommodate and 
vindicate subaltern agencies. Its ideology and legitimacy requires that on occasions 
this is actually just (Thompson 2013 [1975], 263). The values of universality and 
equity that the rule of law enshrines were central for a sense of Englishness of 
eighteenth century working men and women who took their cases to the courts of 
law in the hope that those standards will be upheld (also Frank 2004, 418). Thus, 
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Thompson emphasized this collective dimension of law and legal ideology, but also 
the constitutive function of the law for nationhood. 
The law and its lexicon has been instrumental for challenging colonial rule 
and more contemporary struggles over equality, rights and justice (Gomez 2000, 
Mawani 2015, Comaroff 2001). Renisa Mawani (2012) explored how Indian migrants 
relied on the language of equality and universality underpinning British citizenship 
to contest the unequal access to white settler colonies by white and ‘coloured’ British 
subjects in the early twentieth century. In claiming their rights as ‘imperial citizens’ 
to immigrate to Canada, they drew comparisons with white Britons and sought to 
distinguish themselves from Canadian ‘natives’ in whose name British Indians were 
disallowed entry to Canada. In doing so, they mobilized racial hierarchies within the 
British empire to claim belonging and recognition and exposed the ‘racial 
unevenness of Imperial belonging’ sanctioned by immigration laws. They premised 
their right to abode in Canada on their degree of civilization as Aryan Asians, which 
they argued placed them closer to white British subjects and above indigenous 
Canadians. Colonial encounters were not just about oppression and force. They 
contributed to shape aspirations and desires of colonial subjects and enfolded them 
into the reproduction of racial antagonisms and hierarchies through which colonial 
power operated. Mediated by the language of the law, struggles for colonial 
inclusion of Indians and Africans often relied on their proximity to the civilized 
British rulers. Through these struggles, they partake in reaffirming racial-colonial 
taxonomies and subjectivities.  
During the rise of the Empire in the Victorian era and after its demise in the 
 11 
second half of the twentieth century, the rule of law played an important role in 
delimiting identities back in the metropole as Britain grappled with the racial 
diversity and mingling driven home by imperial mobility (Rabin 2014). The ‘internal 
others’ –Africans, Asians, Irish and Jews- who came to England to settle in the 
nineteenth century utilized the law to reclaim status as ‘freeborn Englishmen and 
women’ challenging their legal treatment as outsiders and seeking to redraw the line 
between English, British or imperial (Rabin 2017).  
After exploring the centrality of law for the formation the British nation and 
for mediating belonging, the next section turns to examine how the historical 
interplay between law, civilization and nation informs more contemporary debates 
and policies on citizenship, integration and belonging in post-colonial multicultural 
UK.    
 
LEGALITY, CIVILITY AND BELONGING 
 
Historically, British national identity has been constructed around the law as a 
civilizing agent. As I showed above, the law as a civilizer, legitimized the British 
imperial project during colonial expansion, and served to restrict the mobility of 
colonial people bound to Britain. The link between legality, civility and empire 
endures as the boundaries of belonging to Britain are being reinforced in tandem 
with mass migration. Both in official documents and popular culture, the rule of law 
is asserted as one of the defining values of Britishness. Parliamentary democracy, an 
independent judiciary and the courts, and a strong civic attachment to the law recur 
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in the revival of British nationalism since the late 1990s.  
In recent years, concerns about social fragmentation, lack of integration and 
religious fundamentalism linked to perceived uncontrolled migration have triggered 
an outburst of British parochialism and patriotism around the rule of law (Gilroy 
2012) and resulted in changes to citizenship policies. In 2002, the UK government 
introduced a ‘citizenship test’ as a statutory requirement for naturalization to 
appraise aspirants about the fundamental values and principles of British life 
(including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, tolerance and civic 
participation) (Bassel et al. 2017). A recent report on social cohesion commissioned 
by the government recommended that migrants pledge an ‘integration oath’ and 
were educated on British values, laws and history in school to improve their social 
integration (Casey 2016, 18). When defending the report before Parliament, its 
author Louise Casey stated that immigrants should know the ‘rules of the game’, 
adding: ‘It was interesting to go round the country and hear that nobody had talked 
to them about our way of life here and when to put out the rubbish, nobody had told 
them when to queue or be nice. As part of the package that would be no bad thing’.iv 
In linking civility, legality and citizenship, Casey resorted to the authority of the law, 
as secular, neutral, objective and superior to other normative systems, to solve the 
tensions of multicultural conviviality and as a measurement of belonging.  
In the same vein, following the Trojan Horse allegation,v former British 
Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron (2014) suggested that social and 
cultural isolation were the product of a timid, hesitant, weakened patriotism, and 
recommended as a solution a more confident and less apologetic assertion of 
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Britain’s values –what he termed ‘muscular liberalism’ (Cameron 2011). In 
reminding the audience of Britain’s global contribution to the rule of law, he spoke 
of the Magna Carta as a founding charter whose ‘principles shine as brightly as ever, 
and they paved the way for the democracy, the equality, the respect and the laws 
that make Britain, Britain’. In a previous speech on radicalization and terrorism, he 
explicitly linked the commitment to the rule of law to national belonging:  
a genuinely liberal country… believes in certain values [Freedom of speech, 
freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights regardless of 
race, sex or sexuality] and actively promotes them… It says to its citizens, this 
is what defines us as a society: to belong here is to believe in these things. 
(Cameron 2011) 
After the London bombings of July 2005, his predecessor, Labour Prime Minister 
Tony Blair, had similarly foregrounded civic values –‘the belief in democracy, the 
rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its shared 
heritage’- as the core of Britishness, urging migrants: ‘conform to [them]; or don’t 
come here’. Embracing the notion of ‘active citizenship’ (Zedner 2010), he reminded 
prospective applicants for naturalization that British citizenship is a privilege which 
must be earned and comes with duties, like paying taxes, learning English, obeying 
the law and integrating into the British way of life. Obeying the rule of law, Blair 
lectured Britain’s ethnic minorities, is not optional and should take precedence over 
religious and cultural affiliations and identities (Blair 2006).    
Leaving aside the paradox involved in wielding ‘British values’ –freedom, 
tolerance and respect- for compulsory assimilation and acculturation, Blair’s and 
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Cameron’s words articulate and resurrect a folk version of British patriotism 
constructed around its laws and legal system. In singling out the rule of law as 
distinctively British, these discourses of nationhood conveniently elide the place of 
the law in colonial domination while masking the contribution of the anti-colonial 
and independence movements in advancing civil, social and political freedoms and 
rights (Mawani 2015, Kannabiran and Singh 2008). By suggesting that crime, 
radicalization, intolerance and misogyny are products of a deficit in rule of law 
culture, they also extra-territorialize and racialize ‘bad behavior’ (Volpp 1996, 2000, 
Author 2017a). As Gilroy (2002, 91) explained, the construction of national identity 
around legality avows perceptions of black criminality as un-British and legitimizes 
an authoritarian and ‘muscular’ form of governance which implicitly relies on racial 
categorizations to single out sources of disorder and threats (also Hall et al. 1978, 
McBarnet 1981b). As the UK grapples with its postcolonial children and the new 
immigrants from elsewhere, the law as civilizer continues to be evoked in public 
discourse and policies for setting standards of behavior and for delimiting who 
should fall within the boundaries of belonging. Reminiscent of empire, hierarchies of 
civility and belonging are articulated through the language of the law. At the same 
time, the frontiers of the ‘moral community of citizens’ are delineated by ideas of 
active and ‘neo-liberal’ citizenship -such as economic self-sufficiency, civic 
responsibility and readiness to integrate- which in turn underpin normative 
subjectivities (Ramsay 2012, Anderson 2013, Menjívar and Lakhani 2016). As such, 
the law mediates belonging.     
The centrality of the law and legality in national identity is important for 
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understanding collective legal consciousness in Britain. Respondents to a survey on 
this topic reported high levels of trust in the law and the legal system, highlighting 
them as a source of national pride and feelings of superiority in relation to their 
European compatriots and EU institutions. In their analysis, Hertogh and 
Kurkchiyan (2016) found UK respondents to be more confident in their legal system 
and more reluctant to abide by EU law, in comparison to respondents from Poland 
and Romania, and observed that  
most people in the UK seemed fairly positive about domestic law and their 
own legal system. Consequently, they did not feel that the UK could learn 
much from the laws of the EU or the laws of other countries. The dominant 
view was that “it is the other way round. They should look at ours that has 
been set in stone and has worked for years and years”. (Hertogh and 
Kurkchiyan 2016, 412) 
In talking about the law, these respondents not only described the law’s quality; they 
utilized it to speak about their collective identity vis a vis other national groups and 
entities. In doing so, they engaged in what Ruskola (2002) called ‘legal orientalism’.  
 Collective legal consciousness, as we will see in the next section, is intimately 
connected to national consciousness, identity and belonging. Through law’s 
language, authority and standards people communicate the limits and character of 
the nation. The construction of British national identity around the rule of law is 
important for understanding its symbolic power for social ordering in contemporary 
UK. Birmingham’s criminal courthouses offer a glimpse into the centrality of law for 
delimiting identities in multicultural Britain. It is to the analysis of these court 
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interactions that I now turn.  
 
DEMARKATING AND CHALLENGING THE LIMITS OF THE NATION 
THROUGH LAW 
 
Second only to London, Birmingham is one of the most ethnically diverse cities in 
the UK. During the nineteenth century, the city grew as one of the world’s top 
industrial hubs attracting workers from other parts of Britain and from further 
afield, especially the British colonies. Unlike other major English cities like London 
and Liverpool whose economic development was linked to their strategic location 
near a harbour, Birmingham drove industrial innovation and expansion from the 
heart of England; thus its branding as the ‘workshop of the world’ (Hall 2002, 270). 
Specialized in the crafting of metals, its factories profited from British colonial 
expansion as they stocked colonial armies with weapons, and advanced the 
civilizing project through the exportation of goods like watches and cutlery (Hall 
2002, Elias 2000 [1939]).   
Before the 1960s, Birmingham’s migrant population was mostly made of 
people born in Ireland, Jamaica and India. In the following decades, migration from 
Ireland and Jamaica receded, while new arrivals hailed from India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. Since the 2000s, nationals from Eastern European countries –
particularly Poland and Romania- outnumbered other national groups. Today, 
Birmingham is home to a population more likely to have been born outside the UK 
and less likely to be white British than the national average (Birmingham City 
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Council 2013). The last census in 2011 showed that 22.2 per cent of Birmingham’s 
residents were born abroad, compared to the national average of 13.8 per cent; 
nearly half of them arrived in the UK between 2001 and 2011. Pakistan, India, 
Ireland, Jamaica and Bangladesh were the most reported countries of birth outside 
the UK among Birmingham residents (Birmigham City Council 2014).  
The city’s courthouses mirror its demographic diversity and serve as a 
platform for the ventilation of convivial tensions springing from it. Lawyers, 
prosecutors and court staff often nostalgically voice their disquiet about community 
changes brought by migrant groups and link them to the spatial and moral decay of 
the city. Differing ‘cultural’ norms are pinpointed as the main reason why they get 
into trouble (Author 2017a, 2017b). In court cases involving ‘migrant’ defendants, 
notions of crime, race and incivility mingle to draw the boundaries of national 
belonging. The law, its authority, language and standards are constantly evoked in 
the assertion and contestation of these boundaries. 
In this section, I explore the invocation of the law and legality inside the 
courtroom to delimit the boundaries of national belonging. The criminal courts are 
key sites in which the authority of the law is staged and where Britain’s self-image as 
strong, sovereign and governed by the rule of law is communicated. Even in the less 
formal space of the lower court, visitors and clients are continuously reminded of its 
majesty and authority through symbols adorning the courthouse, its grand 
architecture, its ceremonial language and rituals, and the stiff attires worn by its staff 
(Rock 1993, Carlen 1976, Jacobson et al. 2015). This physical embodiment of the law 
plays a key role in the ideological construction of legality as supra-human, 
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immutable, and severed from the messiness of the social world it regulates. The 
criminal courts are civic forums where court participants are appraised against civic 
expectations and values, and assert their belonging to the nation by aligning 
themselves to those civic parameters (Author, 2017). The courts shape social 
attitudes towards the law and are an important source of public knowledge about it 
(Sarat and Felstiner 1989). As Yngvesson (1988, 411) observed, ‘it is through the 
interaction of criminal justice officials with local citizens that “the practical meaning 
of the law”[…] is shaped and the patterns of dominance in court and community are 
reproduced and occasionally challenged’. Court operators and the people who 
appear before them evoke the law, its categories and imagery, to talk about 
themselves and to differentiate themselves from others. Legal discourse constitutes 
subjectivities in ways that are both gendered and racialized (Eaton 1986, Hannah-
Moffat and Maurutto 2010).   
This constitutive function of the law for delimiting belonging transpired 
during court hearings involving non-British defendants. In the mechanic and 
ritualistic routine of the court, judges often paused to remind participants of the 
significance of the law and legal institutions in British democracy –the court system, 
the trial by peers, due process protections and the adversarial system. In one of the 
cases observed, the Crown Court judge thanked the jury in a trial involving two men 
from Poland who were found guilty of burglary. He highlighted the importance of 
being judged by peers rather than professional judges: ‘The jury service is a 
fundamental part of our democracy’. Being judged by peers, the judged implicitly 
reminded jurors and parties, has historically signaled Britain’s commitment to 
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democracy, freedom and rule of law principles and featured prominently in Britain’s 
self-consciousness as ‘the greatest defenders of liberty within Europe’ (Armitage 
2000, 197, also Rabin 2017, 5).  
Other judges took the opportunity to hint at the lawless world participants 
left behind. In a slightly patronizing tone, a magistrate told Mr. Munro that he was 
not allowed to go back to Zimbabwe for Christmas before his trial. The man had 
successfully claimed asylum in the UK fifteen years ago. ‘I hate to ruin anybody's 
Christmas plans –the magistrate continued- but I cannot sympathize with a person 
who wants to return to a country he once fled from, a country that once persecuted 
him. Mugabe is going to be President till he dies, won't he? Governments will 
change all over the world, but not in Zimbabwe’. In other cases, some judges felt the 
need to emphasize the importance of abiding by the law as a civic responsibility of 
new migrants and to promote the respect for the law through sentencing. During a 
hearing where a man from Poland pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of 
alcohol, the district judge asked his solicitor why his client was driving in that 
condition. The lawyer speculated: ‘perhaps is a cultural thing. We see this in certain 
communities –binge drinking’. In his sentencing remarks, the judge reminded Mr. 
Griska of the seriousness of his offence and imposed a 12 month suspended 
sentence, disqualification from driving and a community order to perform unpaid 
work and attend a course to quit drinking. Echoing the lawyer in linking his 
offending to broader community attitudes and norms, the judge addressed him and 
his compatriots: ‘People have to understand that drink driving is like being in a 
possession of a weapon… You will say to all your friends that you have been very 
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lucky [to be spared an immediate custodial sentence]’.  
Assumptions about the unruliness of ‘foreigners’ and their disregard for the 
law surfaced in other court cases. In one of them, a man was in the public gallery 
waiting for his brother to appear in court accused of theft. When his brother 
emerged from the stairs into the dock, he took a picture of him with his phone. The 
man was immediately removed from the room and charged with contempt of court. 
Later on, he returned to the courtroom as a defendant. In his defense, the duty 
solicitor who represented him claimed that Mr. Stanescu was not aware of the 
prohibition to take pictures inside the courthouse and he was naïve about what was 
acceptable in the UK, implying that back in his home country –Romania- there are 
no such restrictions. Ignorance of UK laws is no excuse, the district judge ruled and 
declared his guilt without much fanfare. She told the man, who relied on a 
Romanian interpreter during his brief hearing, that he was duly warned by (English 
only) court signage throughout the building that the recording of proceedings was 
not allowed inside the courthouse. Different normative standards and lack of 
familiarity with UK laws is often couched in terms of deficit in rule of law culture. 
Narratives about foreigners’ criminality by court operators link crime to ‘culture’ 
and cultural attitudes to the law (Author, 2017). Implicit in these accounts are 
assumptions and normative judgements about certain national groups’ collective 
legal consciousness. They show how legal discourse and the narrative of legality is 
central for the construction of ‘otherness’ and the racialization of certain groups.  
Discourses of nationhood inside the courtroom portray the law as a source of 
strength and moral superiority. At the same time, the attachment to the law makes 
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the nation weak, a target of abuse, as this female magistrate reckoned: ‘I think there’s 
a perception [among foreigners] that perhaps in the UK that we are not quite as 
harsh in our justice system so they think that they can get away with it more... So 
their better life that meant perhaps that they come to a country where it isn’t as 
harsh or perhaps as difficult’. For this woman, the law evokes fairness, restraint, 
equality and proportionality. Through the implicitly gendered representation of the 
law, she perceives the nation as feeble, soft, vulnerable to the rapacity of 
unscrupulous outsiders. The use of gendered and racialized attributes and 
metaphors to characterize the nation is, according to Sara Ahmed, a ‘narrative of 
truth’: ‘The risk of being “soft touch” for the nation… is not only the risk of 
becoming feminine, but also of becoming “less white” by allowing those who are 
recognised as racially other to penetrate the surface of the body’ (Ahmed 2014, 3). 
Through figurative and emotional discourse, this narrative powerfully conveys the 
risks of softness and implicitly compels the British ‘public’ to support a more 
masculine, harder, less emotional response to the plight of others.      
While legality is a vehicle for demarcating the boundaries of national 
belonging and casting out uncivilized people and places, some of the court 
participants deployed the law and its categories for shifting and unsettling those 
boundaries, as in the trial of Mr. Saeed.  
Mr. Saeed was charged with the offense of driving through a ‘no way street’ 
and racially aggravated assault against a police officer. During his trial, he sat 
quietly but attentively beside a court interpreter who assisted him during part of the 
hearing. The complainant, Mr. Singh, gave evidence first. Mr. Singh, a police officer, 
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told the bench of magistrates that he summoned the defendant to move his car from 
the pavement warning him that he would face a fine if he refused. Subsequently Mr. 
Saeed threatened to report him while making the engine of his car sound loudly and 
pulling out his phone to record the incident. At that point, the officer requested 
assistance. He recalled walking away from the encounter when he saw the 
defendant driving toward him and shouting at him. In his version of events, Mr. 
Saeed got out of his car and started to speak on the phone in Kurdish. Although he 
was not able to listen to the full conversation, he heard ‘Indian boy’, ‘gun’, ‘shoot’ 
and that ‘we have to show him the Kurdish way’. The officer assumed this was a 
threat. 
The second witness, who came to assist his colleague, said that he arrested the 
defendant and took him to the police station on his patrol with a third officer. While 
driving, he mentioned that Mr. Saeed was very agitated talking about a conspiracy 
of the three Indian police officers towards the Iraqi Muslim community and referred 
to him and his colleagues as ‘puppets of the British government’. According to the 
witness, Mr. Saeed also mentioned: ‘It was not to be another Duggan and he will 
speak to high people to take officers to court’, referring to the case of Mark Duggan 
who was shot dead by the police in Greater London in 2011 and whose death 
sparkled riots across the country. He read the transcribed interview to Mr. Saeed, 
who complained about having been arrested illegally and arbitrarily: ‘you arrested 
me like I was a terrorist’ he protested ‘You arrested me because I am Iraqi, I am 
Muslim’. A third police officer who assisted in the arrest and interrogation of Mr. 
Saeed agreed with his colleagues, recounting a similar version of events. Throughout 
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their testimonies, they suggested that Mr. Saeed had difficulties in abiding by the 
rules and respecting authority, and he had ‘issues with certain people, members of 
certain communities’. 
When the police officers were cross-examined by the defendant’s solicitor, it 
transpired that the row was instigated by something Mr. Singh said to the 
defendant. According to Mr. Saeed, he shouted at him: ‘This is not Iraq, you cannot 
park the car on the pavement!’ The defendant denied threatening the officer 
suggesting that Mr. Singh had misunderstood the conversation and used his 
testimony to disavow the picture of him as a disobedient and uncivilized foreigner. 
Speaking without the assistance of the interpreter, he told the court he had been a 
professional bus driver for seven years and grew up ‘in this country’. He never had a 
criminal conviction and he had always abided by the law: ‘As a professional driver, I 
teach my family to drive safely in this country. I wouldn’t drive on a “no way” 
street’. Recalling the alleged fault that triggered the incident, he explained, 
‘Sometimes we do here in the United Kingdom when there is no room we park on 
pavement’. That morning, he told the bench, he went to a garage to change the tires 
of his car, as he was told by the ‘Indian MOT’. ‘I have nothing against Indians’, he 
added, trying to deny any racial animosity towards the police officers. He explained 
that he filmed the officer because he thought Mr. Singh was acting arbitrarily in 
fining him and addressing him in a disrespectful manner, even after he moved the 
car as was ordered. Mr. Saeed admitted being offended by the way the police 
addressed him not only because he shouted at him. Being characterized as both a 
‘foreigner’ and ‘unruly’ was particularly humiliating.  
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In his deposition, he rebutted this portrayal by asserting his alliance to the 
law. Mr. Saeed was dazzled by the law, while at the same time disappointed by it. ‘I 
loved the law’, he expressed with certain disaffection in the past tense. The reference 
to Mark Duggan and the perceived discriminatory and arbitrary treatment he 
endured by the police tainted the image of the law as supra-human, objective, 
impartial, and uncorrupted. At the same time, his testimony revealed a tension 
between these two contradictory views. On the one hand, he complained about the 
police cover-up while ascribing his maltreatment to these three police officers and 
suggesting an ethnic comradery between them: ‘I said I wish there is an independent 
police, not friends coming together. I am a human and I didn’t like how you treated 
me’. He denounced the officers for clothing their power in the language of the law. 
On the other hand, he expressed renewed faith in the law as an antidote to police 
misbehavior by asserting his rights as a citizen and criminal suspect. He questioned 
the grounds for his arrest, he asked to be interviewed by different officers who had 
previously not intervened in the arrest and requested a lawyer to be present during 
it. He complained about being cautioned for the driving offense and then being 
interviewed for a different charge, the racially aggravated assault.   
On its face, the incident involved a mundane neighborhood altercation over 
the use of public space. Yet, as the trial of Mr. Saeed progressed, the primary 
accusation for a driving offense faded into insignificance as the underlying issues 
that triggered the dispute between the two men took center stage. The court setting 
became the forum for ventilating tensions in multicultural conviviality and 
competing ideas of civic inclusion. Their row involved broader questions about 
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authority, civility and national belonging, and the claims for recognition which were 
articulated through the language and authority of the law. The invocation of the law 
evoked the Empire and its legacy for buttressing and undermining its authority. It 
also brought home its power to delimit identities in contemporary multicultural 
Britain. For Mr. Saeed, the law conjured at the same time fairness and oppression, a 
normative ideal and a tool of domination, and elicited admiration and resentment. In 
his eyes, the law was white. The wielding of its power by brown police officers cast 
doubts on its authority and legitimacy.   
While these competing ideas about the law surfaced during the trial, they 
were skillfully effaced by the parties in framing the incident as a trivial inter-
personal dispute. By personalizing (and racializing) the conduct of the police officer 
and circumscribing it as an instance of abuse of power, Mr. Saeed prevented his first-
hand experience of the law from tainting law’s normative ideal as objective, 
impartial and rational. In so doing, he contributed to its hegemony (cfr. Silbey 2007, 
343)  
The staging of the incident in the courtroom ultimately shows how these men 
utilized the authority of the law in conflicting ways while simultaneously trying to 
deflect its power. The bench of magistrates declared Mr. Saeed not guilty of the 
driving offense and guilty of racial abuse, a finding that might have confirmed his 
belief in law’s equity. The strategic alignment to the law by these men ultimately 
reveals its power for social ordering.  
Like Mr. Saeed, other litigants utilized law’s language to contest the charges 
against them and claim belonging. The court’s clientele gathers together a range of 
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populations for whom the law is ‘all over’ (Sarat 1990, Ewick and Silbey 1991, 
Cowan 2004). Its pervasive presence in the everyday life of the marginalized urban 
poor constitutes them as welfare dependents, delinquents or migrants, or a 
combination of them. At the same time, their marginalized status makes them legally 
powerless. Unsurprisingly, marginalized and disempowered populations are often 
skeptical and cynical about the law and of its promises. As Agnieszka Kubal 
documented in her research with return migrants to Ukraine, their subordinate 
social position in the hosting country informed their attitudes to and perception of 
the law.  For them, the law ‘resonates not necessarily with the comfort and 
protection that compliance with the law can give, but with a fear of falling foul of the 
law, demonstrating law’s power to exclude and punish those who transgress it…’ 
(Kubal 2015, 77).   
The foreign clientele of the court combine different forms of disadvantage due 
to racial, socioeconomic and civic subordination. Some of them, particularly recent 
arrivals, have little or no practical knowledge of the law. Their body language often 
conveys their puzzlement and submission, as they sit silently and obediently during 
hearings. A young man originally from Vietnam, who was found by the police in a 
dismantled apartment full of cannabis plants, conveyed this legal powerlessness. As 
the lawyers were busy trying to establish how he got into the UK and what his role 
in the larger chain of marijuana dealing was, Mr. Dang sat beside a woman 
interpreter, looking down, and muttering a few words. For him, it appeared, the law, 
its language and its institutional embodiment, were just too overwhelming and 
inaccessible.  
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Likewise, Mr. Akram found it hard to understand why it got in his way. 
Unable to decipher it, he perceived the law as an obstacle, an imposition, an 
amorphous shadow chasing him. ‘What kind of law is this?’, he said to the Kurdish 
interpreter in English, ‘What is the issue? I went to the police station for help [and I 
ended up in court]. Nobody is asking me’. Mr. Akram was brought to court due to 
an incident in a coffee shop where he allegedly threw a cup and broke a window. 
His hearing had to be adjourned several times because he was agitated and shouted 
at the judge. Ignoring an anxious district judge who demanded his plea to continue 
the proceeding, Mr. Akram desperately tried to tell his story: ‘I am homeless. I am 
not here for benefits, what are the issues here?’, he complained in broken English. 
Dismissed as mad, he refused to follow the apparently evident logic of the law. For 
him, the broken glass was irrelevant. Convinced that he was caught by the law 
because of his foreignness, he tried to deflect its power by claiming he was mistaken 
for the wrong migrant.  
While some of the court’s foreign clients struggled with court proceedings, 
others displayed a remarkable ability to decode social expectations. In strategically 
mobilizing the law, these people sought to distance themselves from negative 
connotations of ‘foreigners’ and to contest essentialized categories while aligning to 
social and moral expectations about the ‘good citizen’ (Abrego 2011, Delgado 2016, 
Author 2016). One of them, a man convicted for driving while disqualified and 
without insurance, told the probation officer he was sorry for not abiding by his 
disqualification. He highlighted his self-worth as a law-abiding citizen and diligent 
worker adding that ‘he respected the laws of the country’ and had been ‘industrious 
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and hard working’ since he arrived in the UK. Mr. Bugawski’s pre-sentence report 
recounted his migration journey from Poland to the UK, his efforts to learn English 
and his work ethic in a bid to persuade the magistrates of his civic capital and to 
pass a lenient sentence. In trying to tilt the law to their side, the men who appeared 
before the court drew on their manly credentials as ‘respectable poor’, breadwinners, 
workers, and law-abiding, to contest their outsider status. Given the strong 
incentives to plead guilty, for many of them, the sentencing stage is their only 
opportunity to be heard and offer a more complex and individuated self-portrait, 
albeit mediated by their lawyers, than their standardized, impersonal and faceless 
representation captured in police records and presented to the court by the 
prosecutor (Lynch 2015).   
By translating their worthiness into the language of the law, these defendants 
showed an ability to utilize the markers of neoliberal citizenship to contest their 
devalued identities (Menjívar 2011, García 2014). In turn, this strategic utilization of 
the law for claiming civic inclusion demonstrates the law’s power in normative 
ordering. These self-assertion strategies can be conceptualized as practices or acts of 
citizenship (Isin and Nielsen 2008, Isin 2009, Però 2011). Citizenship is not just a 
passive, formal status granted by the state. It can also be conceived of as a verb, a 
form of political participation through which people constitute themselves as civic 
and political actors and actively claim recognition as right bearers (Bosniak 2000, 
479, Volpp 2014, 81). The notion of citizenship as an act or a practice acknowledges 
the performative and agentive side of citizenship, its fluidity and its potential for 
resistance and anti-subordination (Lewicki and O’Toole 2017).  
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In taking up the language of ‘active citizenship’, these defendants offer a 
more expansive notion of citizenship than that delimited by the government and 
mandated in bureaucratic processes, and which is not reduced to vote, pay taxes and 
learn English. Albeit not always deliberate, these claims for recognition and 
belonging constitute creative breaks in the dominant discourse linking crime, 
incivility and migration. In doing so, these men enact themselves as citizens even 




In this paper, I explored the symbolic and cultural power of the law for producing 
the nation. The rule of law has been a defining feature in British national formation. 
More recently, it has been shored up to instruct ‘outsiders’ about standards and 
expectations that comes with being a citizen, and the limits of civic inclusion. It also 
surfaces in the more banal space of the lower criminal court where its clientele is 
increasingly populated by ‘foreign nationals’ and ‘migrants’. Inside the courtroom, 
court operators remind the people who come before them about the supremacy of 
the rule of law and its institutions in Britain. The architecture and formality of the 
criminal courtroom reinforces the identification between nation and law’s 
supremacy. Despite the increased bureaucratization and downgrading of criminal 
proceedings through summary justice policies (Ashworth and Zedner 2008), the 
criminal courts remain imposing spaces. Like the police (Loader and Mulcahy 2003), 
they occupy a privileged position in the national iconography of treasured and 
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revered institutions. 
The idiosyncratic place of law for British national formation and its centrality 
for delimiting the boundaries of belonging in contemporary UK is important for 
understanding how the law is perceived and consumed by ordinary people, and 
how it shapes British collective legal consciousness. While legal consciousness 
research has shed light on the central place of the law for constituting subjectivities 
and relations within society, it has paid less attention to the law’s role in constituting 
social boundaries and national identity. Legality and its construction is thus 
implicitly circumscribed by national borders. Collective legal consciousness, 
however, is part of the national culture and serves to constitute national boundaries. 
By assuming ‘as a discursive frame the internal life of a bounded political 
community’ (Volpp 2014, 71), this work neglects the link between law, nation and 
power, particularly the place of the law in enforcing the borders of the nation. Socio-
legal work on migrants’ legal consciousness has questioned the national frame of 
reference of much legal consciousness scholarship highlighting how perceptions of 
law and legality among immigrants are informed by their legal status (Abrego 2011) 
and their experience with the law in the host country (Kubal 2015), as well as how 
immigrants’ interactions with the legal system force more plural understanding of 
the law and unsettle hegemonic legal frameworks (Dundes Renteln 2004, Kubal 
2013). This paper contributes to this emergent literature on legality and 
transnationality, while shedding light on the relationship between legality, civility 
and nationhood.  
The association between law and nation is important for understanding how 
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those cast as foreigners perceive the law and use it to contest their outsider status. 
Notwithstanding their skepticism and cynicism, some of the court participants in my 
study tactically enlisted the law on their side pleading allegiance to it or claiming to 
accommodate its civic demands. In doing so, they contested not only their charges 
but also their alleged foreignness. Others just felt overwhelmed by its sheer, 
mystifying power. They knew too well that their precarious status made them 
legally powerless. Still others remained faithful to its promises of due process and 
equality, hanging on to the momentary and impermanent victories of the powerless. 
For all of them, the law was tied to the British nation and evoked its power and 
authority. Their legal consciousness was fraught with contradictions and 
ambivalence and shaped by their ‘foreignness’. The law embodied the sovereign in 
whose behalf power is exercised. It evoked contradictory ideas and emotions. For 
them, the law was both a source of protection and subordination; a resource and a 
constraint; elusive, rigid, abstract, game-like and pliable.  
While isolated, small acts of contestation can provide breathing space and 
moments of dignity, the best they can hope for is to contest the law on its own terms 
and go along with it. By borrowing its language and categories to claim inclusion 
and recognition, they might risk reinforcing gendered and classed expectations and 
asserting the conditionality of migrants’ incorporation upon their capacity to 
assimilate (Volpp 2014, 91). Still, by subverting and unsettling categories through 
which the law is exercised, these acts of citizenship may also be able to shift the ‘map 
of power’ (Merry 1995). In doing so, as Mr. Saeed revealed, these strategies can 
potentially punctuate and interrupt dominant discourses. Despite the difficulties 
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encountered by these defendants in being heard, their brief and often timid 
interventions within the space of the courtroom shed light on the symbolic power of 
the law, its colonial legaciesvi for producing global order and its role for delimiting 
identities in multicultural Britain. However, there is a recognition that further and 
more in-depth research is needed to make justice to these defendants’ experiences 
and perceptions of the law. This article has been written in the hope of stimulating 
that enquiry.       
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i ‘PROJECT TITLE OMITTED’, funded by the British Academy (GRANT NUMBER OMITTED).  
ii An additional period of observations was done between November and December 2016 at the 
magistrates’ court.  
iii This includes the Common Law system, statutory laws and judicial institutions. The Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, which was established in 1833 as the appeal court of the colonial 
territories during the British Empire, still retains jurisdiction to hear appeals from courts of 
Commonwealth countries. Despite growing opposition from countries in the Caribbean, the Privy 
Council’s judicial authority in the region was justified by its role as ‘impartial dispenser of the rule of 
law’. Cfr (Kikby 2017).  
iv As reported in (Travis 2017). 
v The scandal was triggered by anonymous allegations of a systematic and planned Islamization of at 
least three state-funded schools in Birmingham in March 2014. While a report ordered by the 
Department of Education found evidence of ‘a sustained, coordinated agenda to impose 
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segregationist attitudes and practices of a hardline, politicised strain of Sunni Islam’, an investigation 
by Birmingham City Council denied such a concerted plan to promote extremism and radicalization 
(Huffington Post 2014). The incident nevertheless revived calls for the promotion of ‘British values’ in 
schools. On patriotism, multiculturalism and education in modern Britain see (Osler 2009, Struthers 
2016).   
 
